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EQUITY AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 
Global climate change raises a number of important issues for political scientists 
and theorists. One issue concerns the ethics of implementing policies that seek to 
manage the threats associated with dangerous climate change in order to protect 
the interests of future generations. The focus of much of the debate about climate 
change and intergenerational equity is the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (FCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol to this Convention. This 
article outlines the mechanisms adopted by the Kyoto Protocol and three rival 




Global climate change raises a number of important questions for political 
scientists and theorists. International relations scholars have examined the 
complex negotiations amongst states aimed at reducing emissions of greenhouse 
gases such as carbon dioxide (CO2), as well as the human and national security 
implications of global climate change (Barnett, 2002; Stripple, 2005). 
International  political theorists have explored the normative problems raised by 
the fact that the impacts of climate change are expected to bear much more 
heavily on the developing world, which has contributed little to climate change 
(Shue, 2001; Caney, 2005). Meanwhile, scholars of intergenerational equity have 
outlined a series of conceptual problems that complicate the idea that earlier 
generations are obliged to adopt policies of mitigation (to prevent avoidable 
climate changes) or adaptation (to modify human practices to accommodate 
climate changes that are unavoidable) for the benefit of later generations 
(Gardiner, 2004; Page, 2006, pp.99-160).  
The point of intersection for many of the above debates has been the Kyoto 
Protocol on Climate Change, which was adopted in December 1997 and later 
amended at several ‘Conferences of the Parties’ (COPs). In this paper, I offer a 
brief evaluation of the Kyoto Protocol and three rival climate architectures in 
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terms of some basic principles of equity, defined as the fair distribution of benefits 
and burdens amongst persons with competing claims. The principles of equity 
relevant to climate politics take two contrasting forms (Banuri et al., 1996, pp.85-
6; Paavola, Adger and Huq, 2006, pp.3ff).  
Consequentialist principles evaluate acts and social policies according to 
their outcomes, such as the extent to which they promote equality or social 
welfare or are beneficial to the worst off in society. According to Article 2 
of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), 
the objective of international climate change policy is the ‘stabilisation of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’ 
(United Nations, 1995, p.5). 
Procedural principles evaluate the equity of acts or social policies in terms 
of the legitimacy of the way they were brought about, for example that the 
decision-making procedures involved respected the equal status of all 
parties; and that the duties defined by agreements reflect the capacities and 
historical responsibilities of those they bind. According to Article 3.1 of the 
FCCC, international climate change policy must reflect the ‘common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ of developed and 
developing countries (United Nations, 1995, p.3).   
While all of the main climate architectures are promoted on the basis that they are 
consistent with procedural and consequentialist equity, important differences in 
emphasis emerge between the architectures in terms of the balance struck between 
procedure and outcome. The balance struck in each case has had a profound 
impact on the way in which rival architectures are received in terms of global 
appeal and legitimacy. Rival architectures can usefully be analysed in terms of 
their fit with four principles of equity: 
• C1: A safe atmosphere: climate architectures (and the measures they involve) 
should aim to minimise ‘dangerous climate change.’ There is no consensus as 
to what constitutes dangerous climate change, or what level of global warming 
would trigger it since the idea has an irreducibly normative, as well as natural 
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scientific, component (Schneider and Lane, 2006, p.7). However, a useful 
working definition can be found in terms of the aim to limit increases in 
atmospheric concentrations of CO2 to a doubling of their pre-industrial level 
of 280 parts per million (ppm). For comparison, atmospheric CO2 
concentrations reached 377 ppm in 2004 - a 35 per cent increase on the pre-
industrial level (Keeling and Whorf, 2005).  
• C2: Affordability: climate architectures should not be excessively costly to 
adopt for existing and subsequent generations. This is a complex issue, given 
that estimating the social and economic impacts of alternative climate 
responses rests not only on accurate models of climate change for different 
levels of CO2, but also of development, population growth, and migration 
(Tol, 2002, pp.48ff). 
• P1: Universal participation: members of all countries should be represented 
in the construction of the climate architecture and its mechanisms and 
policies; and while future generations cannot participate directly, their 
interests should also be taken into consideration at all times.  
• P2: Fair burden sharing: the costs of implementing the architectures and the 
measures they involve should reflect the differing contributions of each 
country (and its members) to present and future climate change as measured 
by their current and historical greenhouse emissions. 
 
The Kyoto Protocol 
The Kyoto Protocol, which entered into force on 16 February 2005, requires 39 
developed countries to bring about an average of a 5.2 per cent cut in greenhouse 
emissions by 2012 relative to their 1990 levels. The emissions cuts required by the 
Protocol vary from country to country. The EU, for example, which accounts for 
roughly 21 per cent of current global emissions, must reduce its emissions by 8 
per cent; whereas Russia, which accounts for 17 per cent of global emissions, is 
permitted to emit the same amount in 2012 as it did in 1990.  
An important aspect of the Protocol was the introduction of three ‘flexibility 
mechanisms’ to lower the costs of achieving emissions reductions. ‘Joint 
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Implementation’ provides emissions credits for developed countries that 
implement cooperative emissions reductions projects or remove carbon from the 
atmosphere through other mechanisms (Grubb et al., 1999, pp.155ff). A ‘Clean 
Development Mechanism’ allows developed countries to implement projects that 
reduce emissions in developing countries in order to meet their commitment. 
Finally, ‘Emissions Trading’ enables developed countries to buy carbon credits 
from other countries with spare capacity to help meet their commitments.  
The Protocol was refined by a series of COPs leading up to the United Nations 
Climate Change Conference, which took place in Montréal between 28 November 
and 9 December 2005. Negotiators in Montréal reached an agreement in principle 
to extend the terms of the Protocol beyond 2012. They also amended the Clean 
Development Mechanism by raising its budget to $13 billion for 2006-07 and by 
offering further incentives to developed countries that invest in sustainable 
technologies in developing countries. Agreement was also reached to start a 
special fund for research on preparing the world for climate change that cannot be 
avoided and to implement tougher mechanisms of compliance to prevent 
backsliding (United Nations, 2005).  
Despite such changes, the expanded and strengthened architecture that emerged in 
Montréal does not fare particularly well in equity terms. First, a number of 
analyses have indicated that the Kyoto Protocol, even if it is extended to cover 
emissions over the course of this century, would achieve very modest reductions 
in greenhouse emissions. One influential analyst of the original Protocol found 
that it would at best reduce global temperature by only 0.15°C by the year 2050 
relative to a ‘business as usual’ scenario where no international agreement 
obtained, and it seems unlikely that the refined Protocol would herald 
substantially better results (Wigley, 1998).  
Second, the scope of the Protocol, despite it having been ratified by over 140 
countries, is limited. One problem is that developing countries continue to be 
exempt from binding emissions reductions targets. This is a problem because the 
CO2 emissions of a number of developing countries are expanding rapidly. China, 
for example, is now the world’s third largest greenhouse emitter after the US and 
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the EU. Key developed countries, such as the USA and Australia, remain outside 
of Kyoto architecture at least partly because they view Kyoto as unequitable on 
procedural grounds so long as developing countries such as China are not required 
to make emissions cuts. No substantial progress was made at Montreal on the 
issue of participation, despite the US team agreeing to participate in ‘non-binding 
talks on long-term measures’ to combat climate change (United Nations, 2005).  
Third, the complexity of the Protocol has created loopholes such that developed 
countries can meet their targets in ways counter to the ethos of the FCCC or 
escape penalty if they miss their targets (Aldy, Barrett and Stavins, 2003, pp.381-
82). One example involves the purchase of emissions credits from countries that 
will meet their targets as a result of contingent socio-economic factors, such as 
economic stagnation (Russia) or changes in energy production that began before 
1990 (UK and Germany). Another example is the exploitation of the fortuitous 
location with a country’s territory of ‘greenhouse sinks’, such as forests, which 
absorb CO2 or other greenhouse gases so they play no further warming role in the 
atmosphere. Many of the beneficiaries of the inclusion of sinks in the Protocol are 
developed countries associated with high historical emissions, such as Japan, 
Russia, Canada and Australia. In fact, a number of studies suggest that, far from 
bringing about a 5 per cent decrease in global emissions by 2012, the inclusion of 
sinks in the current climate regime may limit any cut in CO2 emissions to at best 2 
per cent on 1990 levels by 2012 (Gardiner, 2004, p.34).  
For all these reasons, the Kyoto architecture seems at best a useful first step in the 
fight against climate change. It might, if it attracts full compliance from developed 
countries, save many existing and future persons from extreme climate impacts in 
the further future, or delay dangerous climate change so that individuals and 
institutions in some countries can adapt to a modified climate system (DeSombre, 
2004, pp.44ff; Singer, 2002, pp.22ff). Yet, it will not fulfil principle C1 for it will 
certainly not prevent CO2 concentrations passing the critical doubling level 
sometime in the next 100 years.  
Relative to its modest benefits, the costs of implementing Kyoto throughout this 
century (P2) would be significant if not crippling to the world’s economy. 
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Interestingly, even critics of Kyoto do not usually claim that it would be 
unfeasibly expensive to implement. Bjørn Lomborg, for example, suggests that 
extending the terms of Kyoto throughout the century would mean that the world 
would have to wait one year to enjoy the economic prosperity it would have 
enjoyed in 2050 if no international action to combat climate change had been 
undertaken (Lomborg, 2001, 323; Singer, 2002, pp.23-4). Moving to Kyoto’s fit 
with procedural principles, we have seen that participation under the protocol (P1) 
is broad, despite the continued absence of the United States and Australia; and the 
basic terms of the architecture (P2) involve developing countries making 
sacrifices broadly in line with their historical and ongoing responsibility for 
greenhouse emissions. 
 
Kyoto Lite  
The ‘Kyoto Lite’ approach, advocated by the current US administration, 
advocates a series of voluntary targets for national greenhouse emissions as part 
of an approach designed to reduce the ‘carbon intensity’ of participating states. A 
state’s carbon intensity is measured by the ratio of its emissions of CO2 relative to 
economic output. By the end of 2005, six states had signed up to the approach: the 
USA, Australia, China, India, South Korea and Japan, which together account for 
more than 50 per cent of current global emissions. The approach (which provides 
incentives to businesses to move away from carbon intense technologies, and 
technology transfer to the developing world) aims to reduce the carbon intensity 
of developed and developing economies through voluntary agreements.  
One problem with Kyoto Lite is that, as economies become more efficient, they 
may experience a downward drift in their carbon intensity indices while emitting 
more and more carbon into the atmosphere. The consequence, as one 
commentator has argued, is that the approach ‘might encourage innovation, but 
would not necessarily lead to real reductions. The world might simply head for the 
abyss more efficiently’ (Pearce, 2005, p.13). Even putting this possibility aside, its 
modest aims and limited scope mean that an international climate response based 
Kyoto Lite would be ineffective in terms of preventing dangerous climate change. 
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The approach could, however, bring some beneficial outcomes for existing and 
proximate generations in developed countries who will gain from modest 
reductions in climate risks and relatively uncompromised economic growth.       
Kyoto Lite fails to respect any of our four principles of equity. In terms of 
principles C1 and C2, it will not, and indeed does not even aim to, prevent a 
doubling of CO2. As a result, it seems a reasonable conjecture that Kyoto Lite 
would be far from affordable in the long-term despite being less costly for many 
developed countries in the short-term than its competitors. The participation of a 
handful of states, and the lack of consultation with the developing world, means 
that Kyoto Lite is in clear violation of the principle of universal participation (P1); 
and the measures to be undertaken are not determined in line with a principle of 
fair burden sharing (P2).  
 
Kyoto Plus 
The ‘Kyoto Plus’ regime, supported by the European Union and a range of non-
governmental organisations, seeks to build on the existing Kyoto architecture 
whilst making a range of modifications. It would require much deeper cuts of 
developed country parties than those proposed in Montréal (up to 30 per cent by 
2030) and introduce a new system of ‘first-time’ targets for developing countries, 
including the bigger emitters such as Brazil, China and India. The approach will 
also involve technology and financial resource transfer to developing countries 
(Pearce, 2005; International Climate Change Taskforce, 2005). 
The Kyoto Plus regime is designed to come into force as the present regime 
expires in 2012, and would initially cover emissions until at least 2030. Beyond 
this point, a set of longer-term objectives and mechanisms would be adopted 
congruent with the aim of avoiding dangerous climate change. A crucial aspect of 
Kyoto Plus is that it aspires, in the longer term, to adopt the principle that each 
person on the planet possesses an equal right to use the absorptive capacity of the 
atmosphere. This principle, however, is not intrinsic to the initial architecture, 
which instead aims to achieve large cuts in greenhouse emissions based on an 
eclectic range of mechanisms and targets designed to prevent dangerous climate 
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change. Because it involves significant cuts in developed country emissions, and 
real engagement of the developing world, Kyoto Plus would have a range of 
beneficial consequences relative to Kyoto and Kyoto Lite, although it would 
certainly cause significant economic disruption in developed and developing 
countries.  
Perhaps the main problem with Kyoto Plus concerns its long-term efficacy. 
Because it would retain many structural features of the original Protocol – such as 
the setting of national emissions targets on the basis of case-by-case negotiation, 
rather than by scientific analyses of what levels of CO2 can be considered safe – it 
is likely that it would only delay the onset of dangerous climate change. It seems, 
therefore, inconsistent with principles C1 and C2 since, as we see below, there are 
alternative architectures that would more efficiently safeguard the climate system 
bequeathed to future generations. Moreover, while the approach maintains a much 
more even balance of procedure and outcome than Kyoto or Kyoto Lite, the 
emissions allocation process is still open to adjustment by parties who enjoy 
unequal negotiating positions with the result that the approach has intrinsically 
inequitable foundations. It is therefore in violation of principles of fair burden 
sharing (P2). Finally, the approach shares the wide, yet far from universal, 
participation profile of Kyoto, which calls into questions the fit with principle P1.  
 
Contraction and Convergence 
The third approach, ‘Contraction and Convergence’, has three main components. 
First, each person on the planet is granted an ‘equal right to emit’ greenhouse 
gases by virtue of their equal right to use the benefits provided by a shared 
atmosphere. This principle is treated as intrinsic to the architecture of the 
approach. Second, a ‘global ceiling’ for greenhouse emissions is set based on a 
calculation of the amount the atmosphere can withstand without dangerous 
climate changes emerging. Third, each country is allocated a yearly ‘carbon 
emissions budget’ consistent with the global ceiling not being exceeded, and 
calculated according to each country’s population size relative to an agreed base 
year (Athanasiou and Baer, 2002, pp.47ff; Meyer, 2000, pp.56ff).  
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The key aim is to bring about a stabilisation, and later a contraction, in global 
greenhouse emissions so that they stay below a safe level; and the idea that, in the 
longer term, all countries will converge on a roughly equal level of per-capita 
emissions compatible with the long-term stability of the climate system. Within 
this approach, a country that wants to emit more than its yearly quota must buy 
credits from countries that have spare capacity. The country selling the credits can 
then invest the receipts in activities enabling it to develop in a sustainable manner. 
This flexibility of the approach means that many developing countries will not be 
required to reduce their emissions to the same extent as developed countries even 
though there will be a cap on how much their emissions are permitted to grow. 
While ‘emissions trading’ is a key feature of all of the proposed successors to 
Kyoto, the trading zone under Contraction and Convergence covers the whole 
planet from the outset. 
Unlike a number of competing approaches, Contraction and Convergence, if fully 
implemented, could be expected to reduce the risks of dangerous climate change 
substantially. Although the approach would be more costly to implement than its 
rivals in the short- to medium-term, it sits more easily with principles C1 and C2 
than its rivals when we focus on the longer-term. It also has the merit that, 
because it adopts emissions targets based on scientific criteria for protecting the 
atmosphere, it reduces the role of power politics in determining the structure of 
the regime. The approach still involves a certain amount of horse-trading 
associated with the selection of the base year (as well as with the specific details 
of mechanisms concerned with emissions trading and the role of sinks) but much 
less than with rival architectures. Moreover, the ‘convergence’ part of ‘contraction 
and convergence’ at least partly deals with the need to achieve a fairer 
international distribution of the benefits associated with CO2 emissions. For all 
these reasons, this architecture seems to fit better with principle P2 than its rivals.  
Finally, contraction and convergence also offers an interesting approach to the 
problem of historical responsibility, which has hitherto dogged attempts to 
construct a truly global solution to climate change to some developed countries 
(principle P1). Contraction and convergence, in being a fundamentally forward-
looking approach to climate change, does not allocate the most costly duties of 
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climate mitigation and adaptation to developed countries because they are 
responsible for the emergence of climate change. Rather, it distributes the duties 
of climate management in line with their ability to undertake the protective 
measures deemed necessary to safeguard a future where dangerous climate change 
is avoided. As a result, Contraction and Convergence may prove more attractive, 
and therefore motivational, than rival architectures that appeal to the controversial 
historical duties members of developed countries possess as a result of the 
behaviour of their ancestors.  
 
Conclusion 
It is not an easy matter to apply principles of equity to the choice amongst 
alternative climate architectures in any definitive manner. Such principles are 
designed to operate in a wide range of circumstances and often seem better suited 
to the analysis of abstract examples rather than concrete policy problems, such as 
climate change. Climate change architectures, by contrast, are neither abstract nor 
designed to address all problems of distribution. Nevertheless, it is important to 
locate alternative architectures in the broader context of equity both for 
intrinsically ethical reasons and because only a truly equitable regime will secure 
popular legitimacy and support. Within this context, I hoped to have outlined an 
ethical framework by which alternative climate architectures might be evaluated 
in terms of equity, and that there is some reason to think that Contraction and 
Convergence represents modest progress at the level of outcomes and procedures. 
It is important to note that one issue that has not been fully addressed is the true 
extent of the economic disruption of climate architectures that aim for significant 
cuts in global greenhouse emissions. Until reliable models of the costs and 
benefits of adaptation and mitigation measures are produced, constructing an 
ethical analysis of competing architectures remains a tentative undertaking. 
 
Notes 
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